

UNCLASSIFIED

E171

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01            ADDIS   04521   201302Z  
ACTION AF-01

RELEASED IN PART  
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

INFO	LOG-00	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	EUR-01	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-00	PRS-01
	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	SNIS-00	NISC-02	PMB-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-01

/041W

-----53C5F9   201303Z /38

O 201256Z JUN 94  
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE  
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2835  
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA  
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
AMEMBASSY MADRID  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI  
AMEMBASSY ASMARA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02            ADDIS   04521   201302Z  
C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 004521

LONDON FOR MCKINLEY

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR  
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, RW, FR, OAU  
SUBJECT: SUPPORT FOR FRENCH INITIATIVE IN RWANDA

REF: STATE 163237

1. CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER  
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)  
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 20 JUN 2016  
DATE/CASE ID: 06 MAY 2011 201005065

UNCLASSIFIED

2. AMBASSADOR RAISED ISSUE OF RWANDA WITH OAU SECRETARY GENERAL SALIM JUNE 20, MAKING THE POINTS IN PARA 6 REFTTEL. AMBASSADOR ALSO PROVIDED SALIM WITH A COPY OF THE TALKING POINTS.

UNCLASSIFIED

3. SALIM MADE THREE POINTS IN RESPONSE, WHICH HE SAID HE HAD ALSO MADE TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON JUNE 17 WHEN HE HAD CALLED ON SALIM TO EXPLAIN THE GOF POSITION. FIRST, HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION TO STOP THE KILLINGS AND PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO RWANDANS.

4. SECONDLY, HOWEVER, HE HAD A CONCERN ABOUT THE TIMING.

B1

IN  
ADDITION, WITH OVER 4000 AFRICAN TROOPS COMMITTED TO AN EXPANDED UNAMIR, AND THEIR ONLY PROBLEM BEING ONE OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, WHY COULDN'T THE FRENCH, U.S. AND  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03      ADDIS 04521 201302Z  
OTHERS SUPPLY THE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THESE TROOPS IMMEDIATELY, AND SEND THEM IN INSTEAD OF THE FRENCH? WE HAD ALL BEEN WORKING THIS ISSUE FOR SOME TIME, AND NOW THE AFRICAN TROOPS WERE READY TO GO.

5. WHICH LED TO THE THIRD POINT: GIVEN THAT AFRICAN TROOPS WERE READY TO GO AND WERE GENERALLY PERCEIVED AS BEING NEUTRAL

B1

6. THE AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT THESE WERE REASONABLE POINTS, AND HE WOULD TRANSMIT THEM TO WASHINGTON. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE BELIEVED OUR CONCERN (AND THAT OF THE FRENCH) WAS THAT, EVEN WITH LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND THE BEST OF INTENTIONS, IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO MOVE IN THE ADDITIONAL TROOPS FOR UNAMIR AS QUICKLY AS THE FRENCH COULD MOVE. AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT THE FRENCH TROOPS WOULD JUST BRIDGE THE GAP, AND THAT WE WERE WORKING TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE AFRICAN CONTINGENTS TO UNAMIR VIA THE UN. WHILE ADMITTING THE PROBLEM WITH THE RPF, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THE FORCE WOULD BE MULTINATIONAL AND THAT WE HOPED THAT DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS COULD CONVINCE THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

RPF TO GIVE THE GOF THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT. WE WERE  
PREPARED TO APPROACH THE RPF TO ENCOURAGE THEIR  
UNDERSTANDING, AND HOPED THAT SALIM WOULD DO THE SAME IN  
HIS CONTACTS WITH THEM.

B1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04      ADDIS   04521   201302Z

B1

8. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. BAAS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED